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STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AS
LIMITATIONS ON STUDENT SPEECH
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Even as private-sector unions have declined in the United States,
the prevalence of occupational licensing and related forms of
accreditation has increased' and entry to hundreds of occupations now
requires licensing.2 While the percentage is higher for graduate and, of
course, for professional programs and schools, "about 29 per cent of the
workforce is required to obtain a license from either the federal, state or
local government to work for pay."3 Thus, professional accrediting and
licensing, and the standards and requirements thereunder in particular,
merit serious attention.
The interaction of professional conduct standards and the speech
of students enrolled in professional programs was recently addressed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Tatro v. University of
Minnesota.4 Declining to apply either the Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District or the Hazelwood School
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law. The author wishes to thank Samantha S. Everett for her
helpful research assistance.
1. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of
Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELATIONS 676, 676 (2010).
2. See id. at 677.
3. Id.
4. 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). See generally William Creeley, A Closer
Look at 'Tatro v. University of Minnesota,' FIRE (June 22, 2012),
http://thefire.org/article/14615.html (arguing that while the grounds for ruling
against the student's free speech claim were not as broad as they might have been,
the decision was still troubling in that the adopted grounds might permit, for
example, a law school to prohibit some otherwise protected law student speech on
the grounds of its presumed incompatibility with academic program rules seeking to
permissibly instill and promote officially adopted professional standards).
5. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
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District v. Kuhlmeier student speech regulation tests, the court sought to
resolve the case on somewhat different grounds. Whether those grounds
are unequivocally narrower than either Tinker or Hazelwood is not
entirely clear. Nor is the court's statement of its own holding entirely
uncontroversial.
For the moment, though, we can say that the Tatro court
perceived the case to involve "a university's imposition of disciplinary
sanctions for a student's Facebook post that violated academic program
rules."8  The court sought to articulate its holding as follows: "[T]he
University did not violate the free speech rights of Tatro by imposing
sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated academic program rules
where the academic program rules were narrowly tailored and directly
related to established professional conduct standards."9
6. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). For a discussion focusing in part on whether
Hazelwood should be interpreted to require that the regulation of apparently school-
sponsored speech be viewpoint-neutral, see R. George Wright, School-Sponsored
Speech and the Surprising Case For Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J.
175 (2007). For an account of the circuit split on this issue, see id. at 189-92. For a
somewhat different angle on the question of viewpoint-neutral regulation of student
speech, see John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L.
REV. 569 (2009). For a more general discussion of the murkiness of the distinction
between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral regulations of speech, and related
issues, see R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of
Speech: The Limitations ofa Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (2006).
There is of course a substantial literature on the Hazelwood case more
generally. See, e.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood 's Core: A New
Approach to Restrictions On School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 65
(2008) (arguing that "Hazelwood has been pulled in so many directions that its
underlying standard has lost coherence"). For discussion of the specific question of
whether Hazelwood, as appropriately adapted, should be applied in public college
and university contexts, see, for example, Jessica Golby, Note, The Case Against
Extending Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier's Public Forum Analysis to the Regulation of
University Student Speech, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1263 (2006); Laura Merritt, Note,
How the Hosty Court Muddled First Amendment Protections by Misapplying
Hazelwood to University Student Speech, 33 J.C. & U. L. 473 (2007); Jeff Sklar,
Note, The Presses Won't Stop Just Yet: Shaping Student Speech Rights in the Wake
of Hazelwood's Application to Colleges, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 641 (2007).
7. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 517-19.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 511.
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This Article briefly addresses the Tatro holding.'o A broader
analysis then considers some possible implications of the underlying
logic of Tatro and similar cases in the context of professional program
requirements, accreditation standards, and various binding or even
aspirational professional organizational and licensing standards, as
interpreted and applied in disciplining student speech.
To anticipate the argument: Despite the court's aspirations, in
limited respects, to free speech constitutional rigor, the Tatro court
actually adopted, rightly or wrongly, a highly deferential form of mere
minimum scrutiny. The University's focus on blogs, however
interpreted, and the court's focus on whether Facebook posts, on or off
campus, as well as the more general fact that Tatro's speech appeared via
social media rather than through traditional or "legacy" media, might
well have impacted the outcome of the Tatro case itself. But these
interesting aspects of Tatro may be far less significant, ultimately, for the
broad, ultimate reach of the case's underlying, basic logic.
In fact, on the Tatro case's logic, even the weight, proven or
speculative, of the school's interest in restricting the student's speech
appears to be of limited constitutional significance as well. Thus, for
example, the underlying logic of Tatro recognizes no significant
constitutional difference, in these sorts of contexts, between student
speech that is believed to indicate a deficiency in the speaker's ability to
competently and fairly treat socially marginalized groups, and student
speech with no such implications. That is, by Tatro's logic, and that of
other comparable cases, all binding professional standards are in this
crucial respect created equal.
Thus apart from certain realistically avoidable exceptional cases,
and apart from any of several substantial changes in the relevant
constitutional law, free speech-based challenges to school discipline on
the basis of relevant professional conduct standards and accreditation
requirements are likely to be unavailing.
A professional-program student thus might prevail if, for
example, a court chose to apply the Hazelwood standard, as modified for
the professional-program context, but only if the court then: broadened
the idea or scope of school-sponsored speech; interpreted Hazelwood to
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part Ill.
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require that the restrictions on student speech be viewpoint-neutral; and,
more importantly, radically reconceived and dramatically narrowed the
range of speech regulations that would count as viewpoint-neutral, and
thus narrowed the meaning of "viewpoint-neutrality" itself.
In particular, a university speech regulation that seeks to retain a
program's accreditation by preparing students to follow specified
professional standards in the treatment of all clients, including
historically marginalized or vulnerable group members, would have to
count as viewpoint-based, rather than as viewpoint-neutral. This would
be in distinct contrast to current Tatro-style opinions, which assume that
the regulations in question target not speech viewpoints, but the student's
failure to follow specified established professional conduct norms.
Again, this is not to argue for or against any such changes. The aim is
instead simply to clarify the real import and potential impact of Tatro
and related cases.
Another possible means by which professional-program students
might commonly prevail on their free speech claims would require that
courts abandon the quite substantial degree of deference they have
traditionally accorded to graduate and professional programs, especially
in matters of academic standards and the evaluation of students. This,
clearly, would require a dramatic change in the law in a number of
contexts.12
Finally, professional-program students whose speech is restricted
under Tatro-like cases might prevail: where they can argue that the
12. See, generally Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988-89 (2010)
(ruling that courts should refrain from replacing the judgment of school authorities
with their own); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985)
(holding that judges should show great deference to the professional judgment of
faculty); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1978)
(deciding that "[e]ven assuming that the courts can review under an [arbitrary and
capricious] standard . . ." there was no such showing in this case); Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (ruling the university faculty
members' interests of academic freedom outweighed the state's interests in
overturning a law requiring faculty members to certify they were not a communist as
unconstitutional); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (holding that the
state could not require plaintiff to answer questions regarding a lecture he gave at the
state university). For an analysis of these cases, see generally R. George Wright, The
Emergence ofFirst Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REV. 793 (2007).
program's relevant rules are simply not "established," either formally or
informally; where the rules are contrary to binding law; where the rules
are unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous, or mutually inconsistent; or
where the rules are being applied, generally or in the present case, in an
arbitrary, politically biased, or merely pretextual way. Each of these
latter issues, however, can presumably be avoided by reasonable
conscientiousness and uniformity of approach on the part of the
academic program in question, and by focusing on consistent and
consistently-applied judgments as to the interests of future clients, along
with the integrity of the profession and its gate-keeper programs.
Realistically, then, absent a substantial change in the law, or
questionably managed program policies, it is difficult to imagine a
student free speech claim prevailing in Tatro-like cases. The fact that the
restricted speech is that of a student, or a student-intern, who may not yet
be actually working in the program's targeted profession, makes no
relevant fundamental difference in this respect.
This is again not to draw any normative conclusions as to this
particular state of constitutional affairs. As we shall briefly see below,13
it is possible to argue that along with the benefits of such institutions,
policies, and First Amendment rules, there may well be accompanying
costs, including costs in general liberty as well as speech. And it is also
possible that these benefits and costs may vary with the degree of
emerging rights-consciousness, on various fronts, and as well with the
degree of political self-sorting and polarization that is characteristic of
the society at any given time.
II. TA TRO AND RELATED CASES
Amanda Tatro, a college-level junior, had enrolled in the
University of Minnesota's Mortuary Science Program. 14  Eventually,
Tatro posted on her Facebook page several status updates arguably
suggesting a certain degree of light-hearted irreverence toward the
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 511.
15. Tatro's Facebook page was then accessible by "friends" and "friends of
friends," but it is not clear that the court's analysis hinges, at any point, on the
relatively broad accessibility of the status updates at issue. Id at 512.
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particular human cadaver to which she was assigned, but which Tatro
herself characterized as "satirical commentary and violent fantasy about
her school experience." The campus disciplinary process resulted in a
key finding that "Tatro had violated the Student Conduct Code and
academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human
cadavers."' 7 Summarizing its holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court
declared that "the University did not violate the free speech rights of
Tatro by imposing sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated
academic program rules where the academic program rules were
narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct
standards."' 8
According to the University and amici curiae, the rules in
question served to educate students as to their future professional and
ethical responsibilities,19 stabilize the Anatomy Bequest Program,20 and
promote compliance with the relevant professional education accrediting
standards.21 At a particularized level, Tatro had agreed to program
22
rules to the effect that "'[c]onversational language of cadaver dissection
outside the laboratory should be respectful and discreet' and that
[b]logging23 about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not
allowable. The anti-blogging rule, it should thus be noted, was not
limited to even arguably disrespectful, indiscreet, or privacy-implicating
material.
As for the appropriate constitutional free speech standard to
apply, the court understandably declined to apply either the Hazelwoocj
16. Id. at 511.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 516-17.
20. See id at 517.
21. See id.
22. It is important to note that the court relied in this respect on the (sufficient)
establishment of these program rules, and not on the presumed fact that Tatro herself
had explicitly agreed to follow those particular rules. See id. at 521 n.6.
23. The court determined that Facebook posts, in the form presumably of
typical status updates on one's own page, fell within the scope of the term
"blogging." See id. at 512.
24. Id. at 516 (alteration in original).
25. See id. at 518 (discussing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988)).
or the Tinker standards. Briefly put, the court declined to apply
Hazelwood because, whatever the possible adverse consequences or
implications of Tatro's Facebook postings, they would not be perceived
by a reasonable observer as school-sponsored curricular speech
27
apparently bearing the approval or imprimatur of the school.
The court also declined to apply Tinker's "risk of substantial
28disruption" standard. The court on this point sensibly concluded that
[t]he driving force behind the University's
discipline was not that Tatro's violation of
academic program rules created a substantial
disruption on campus or within the Mortuary
Science Program, but that her Facebook posts
violated established program rules that require
respect, discretion, and confidentiality in
connection with work on human cadavers.29
The Tatro court concluded instead that "in certain professional programs,
valid curricular requirements can encompass compliance with
professional and ethical obligations. 30 On the basis of the accumulated
record, the court found the applicable program rules to be sufficiently
established, non-pretextual, directly related to the relevant program
standards, and, crucially, "narrowly tailored"' to the interests at stake.32
Now, it must be said that there is clearly some sense in which the
broad, flat, exception-less universal prohibition of any and all
26. See id. at 518-20 (discussing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
27. Id. at 518.
28. See id. at 518-20 (discussing, among other cases interpreting Tinker, J.S.
v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930-31 (3d Cir. 2011); Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008)).
29. Id. at 520.
30. Id. (citing and discussing Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 732 (6th Cir.
2012); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878 (11th Cir. 2011)). The court's
reference to "certain" professional programs is not entirely clear, as it is unclear
which professional programs, if any, would fall categorically outside the Tatro rule.
Perhaps a professional program whose professional or accrediting aegis and
authority were at the time in utter disarray, at least on the relevant disciplinary issue.
31. Id. at 521, 523.
32. See id. at 521-23.
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"'[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection"' 33 is not
genuinely narrowly tailored to any of the relevant professional or
academic purposes.34 This is not a matter of unrealistically insisting on
perfection in rule-drafting, or of exaggerating the importance of rare
occurrences. It is instead simply difficult to imagine how the assumed
public interests at stake require, for example, that the entire broad class
of responsible, sensitive, thoroughly professional blog posts about, say,
one aspect or another of the anatomy lab be prohibited. Another broad
class of lab-related blog posts could be classified as merely innocuous,
even if they do not actually further the public interests at stake. Lab-
related blog posts addressing matters of genuine public interest,
including issues of public policy, would presumably be within the scope
of the ban. Entirely legitimate safety warnings to one's colleagues,
whether posted or tweeted elsewhere or not, would also seem to fall
within the scope of the ban as well. Therefore, even a system requiring
pre-clearance of relevant blog posts by a school authority would be
substantially more narrowly tailored.
The Tatro court nevertheless held the academic program rules to
be narrowly tailored. The key step in the court's logic on this point is
the adoption not of the rigorous narrow tailoring requirement for content-
or viewpoint-based regulations of speech,37 but of the less rigorous
38
narrow tailoring requirement for content-neutral regulations of speech.
The court thus asked merely whether the speech restrictions at issue were
"'substantially broader than necessary"' 39 to promote the public interests
33. Id. at 516.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
35. For an extremely elaborate explanation of such a system in the public
employment context, see for example, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980);
Weaver v. USIA, 87 F.3d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
36. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523.
37. See Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation: The
Limitations of a Common Distinction, supra note 6, at 3 53-58.
38. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523; Wright, Content-Based and Content-
Neutral Regulation: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, supra note 6; R.
George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What
They Do, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 167, at 186-87 (1997).
39. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989)) (emphasis added).
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at stake, quoting at this point the quintessential content-neutral speech
regulation case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism.4 0
The program's emphasis on matters such as respect, dignity, and
discretion in speech on particular subjects 4 1 might at least vaguely
suggest that the speech regulations at issue were based on the content of
the speech in question. But instead, the judicial thinking in this area
generally tends to focus on the regulation of professional or pre-
professional conduct, as distinct from non-conduct speech, and on the
institutional and professional goals, interests, and standards at stake,
including the anticipated harms to potential or actual clients.42 To clarify
the point, the government is not seeking to regulate certain secondary
effects of speech that are unmediated by anyone's belief or disbelief in
officially disfavored ideas.43  The government is instead seeking to
40. 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989) (concluding that the sound volume
restrictions on amplified music in Central Park were valid).
41. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514, 516-17, 523.
42. See id. at 523. See also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012)
("When a university lays out a program's curriculum or a class's requirements for all
to see, it is the rare day when a student can exercise a First Amendment veto over
them."); id. at 739 ("What poses a problem is not the adoption of an anti-
discrimination policy; it is the implementation of the policy, permitting secular
exemptions but not religious ones and failing to apply the policy in an even-handed,
much less a faith-neutral, manner."); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 872
(11th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he remediation plan was imposed because she expressed an
intent to impose her personal religious views on her clients, in violation of the ACA
Code of Ethics."); id. at 872-75 (reaching the conclusion that the student
remediation plan "was viewpoint neutral"); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277,
1292-93 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Although we do not second-guess the pedagogical
wisdom or efficacy of an educator's goal, we would be abdicating our judicial duty
if we failed to investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern was
pretextual.") (emphasis in original); Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-cv-
00205, 2012 WL 1078819, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2012) (noting judicial
deference as particularly appropriate in the health care area, where granting a degree
"places the school's imprimatur upon the student as qualified to pursue his chosen
profession") (citation omitted). For discussion of the realistic impossibility, if not
incoherence, of any relevant government policy's being 'neutral' with respect to the
free exercise of religion, see R. George Wright, Can We Make Sense of "Neutrality"
in the Religion Clause Cases?: Seven Rescue Attempts, and a Viable Alternative, 66
SMU L. REV. 877 (2013).
43. For judicially authoritative discussion, see generally City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (discussing generally secondary effects
of speech).
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regulate professional conduct where the conduct in question is believed
by the relevant profession to lead to bad outcomes or experiences for
44
clients or other affected persons.
The speech for which the student is disciplined is clearly an
element in the causal chain leading to what the profession considers an
undesirable outcome or experience for the client. But in another sense,
speech by the disciplined student is not an essential element of the logic
of the academic or professional discipline imposed.
Let us thus assume, by way of a general example, that a medical
student believes that a particular diagnostic machine should be reset or
recalibrated in some way whenever the patient is a member of some
particular specified group. The student may believe this for any sort of
reason, ranging from the purest technical issue to the most overtly
political or religious reason. No one, including, crucially, the patient,
knows about this resetting process until it is later discovered by third
parties.
If the relevant professional group considers this machine
resetting to be without sufficient scientific basis and to risk the health of
at least some of the patients involved, the professional group might well
seek to impose, directly or indirectly, some sort of measured and
appropriate professional or academic sanctions on the medical student in
question, beyond merely engaging in a debate on the merits. And the
basic motive in seeking sanctions-patient medical well-being-would
be unaffected by whether the medical student had engaged in speech, and
by the content or viewpoint of any possible symbolic speech engaged in
by the medical student, precisely in the act of resetting the diagnostic
machine. This example also illustrates that any possible reaction by a
44. See supra note 42. For an example of potentially binding professional
ethical standards with a direct or indirect effect, of some sort, on speech, see Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 2010, THE AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS'N, http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). See,
e.g., APA binding Standard 3.01, id. at 5 ("In their work-related activities,
psychologists do not engage in unfair discrimination based on age, gender, gender
identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation,
disability, socioeconomic status or any basis proscribed by law."). See also non-
binding, but potentially educationally adoptable, Principle E, id. at 4 (dealing with
respect). Of course, some dubious professional practices can be rendered statutorily
illegal pursuant to the exercise of state police power.
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patient to student-practitioner speech is not essential to the logic of the
relevant sort of professional or academic discipline.
III. SOME CLASSIC ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
It seems likely that the overall significance of legally enforceable
standard setting and related activities by organized professional groups
has increased in the U.S. over time. Some of the broad theory seeking to
explain why this might have happened has been expounded by the well-
regarded economist Mancur Olson.4 5
The basic policy logic of acculturating future professionals to the
technical and ethical standards expected of practitioners, and of
practitioners in training, seems intuitively clear. We have suggested
some of that policy logic in Section II above. But given the arguably
large and increasing significance of this general area of the law, it seems
advisable to at least briefly note alternative perspectives, whatever their
ultimate import.
Classically, John Stuart Mill strongly valued the idea of
universal education, to one degree or another, even if not the idea of
46broad provision by the state. Mill preferred a system of voluntary
official certification of educational achievement beyond some specified
minimum level.4 7 In the educational testing context, Mill argued that
"[a]ll attempts by the State to bias the conclusions of its citizens on
disputed subjects are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and
certify that a person possesses the knowledge requisite to make his
conclusions on any given subject worth attending to." 4 8
45. Expanding on his classic work on the logic of collective political action,
Olson argues, in brief, that "[s]table societies with unchanged boundaries tend to
accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time."
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 41 (1982) (emphasis omitted). For some
quantitative data, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
46. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 175-79 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
Penguin Books Ltd. 1974) (1859).
47. See id. at 177-78.
48. Id. at 178.
436 [Vol. 11I
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Mill elaborates on how the aims of educational certification and
state neutrality toward "disputed subjects" 49 or "opinions",o can be
reconciled along the following lines:
[T]he knowledge required for passing an
examination . . . should, even in the higher classes
of examinations, be confined to facts and positive
science exclusively. The examinations on religion,
politics, or other disputed topics should not turn on
the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter
of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on
such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or
churches."
Our confidence in the distinction between opinions and inevitably
theory-laden matters of fact may well be less robust than was Mill's. But
the more important point is that many citizens would prefer some sort of
certification-whatever the procedural mechanism-that encompasses
more than narrow technical competence. In any sort of therapist or
counselor, for example, we doubtless want, say, a knowledge of the
names of the relevant bodily parts. But we may well also appreciate a
certain degree of sensitivity to who we are. We may certainly be open to
appropriate challenges. But we likely do not wish to be humiliated,
however unintentionally, or even well-intentioned, by a therapist whose
goals or priorities are substantially different from our own. Some of us
may even be willing to sacrifice a degree of narrow technical
competence for a sense of empathy, responsible reassurance, or
connectedness. That a therapist's lack of empathy may take the form of
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Mill is in general concerned especially about any prospective state
monopoly on education. See id. at 176-77. More broadly, some economists have
been concerned not so much with producer monopolies in themselves, assuming
them to be typically unstable, but with monopolies that acquire some sort of
entrenched legal status, and are distinctively "buttressed by public authority."
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 99 (3d ed.
1962).
words, or opinions, and thus speech, is itself of little concern to the
.52patient in question.
While Mill's approach focuses largely on politics and cultural
philosophy, Professor Milton Friedman's critique of occupational
licensing adds an economic dimension. Friedman "viewed licensing's
entry restrictions as creating undesirable monopoly rents through greater
barriers to entry."53 Thus Professor Friedman argues that "registration,
certification, or licensure, almost inevitably becomes a tool in the hands
of a special producer group to obtain a monopoly position at the expense
of the rest of the public."5 4 Further, according to Friedman, "the people
who might develop an interest in undermining the regulations are kept
from exerting their influence. They don't get a license, must therefore go
into other occupations, and will lose interest."" The results may include
reduced rates of meaningful intra-group experimentation and reduction in
the growth of knowledge.56 Professor Friedman's critique thus extends
beyond possible effects on the liberties of various affected persons, let
alone on freedom of speech in particular. To that extent, his critique is
beyond the scope of our present concern herein.
We can say, along with Professor Friedman himself, that even
government-entrenched professional monopolies must face certain
vulnerabilities.5 7 Goods and services produced even by official
monopolies can be substituted for, perhaps by newly developed
technologies. Monopolies may indeed inadvertently incentivize the
52. The opinions expressed by certified professionals, speaking on their own
behalf, in venues such as professional journals or peer-reviewed research
publications, doubtless raise additional issues. The cost of a profession's stagnation
due to enforcement, formal or informal, of an orthodoxy ripe for responsible
empirical challenge in such venues could be substantial. For a sense of the scope of
such possibilities, see John P.A. loannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings
Are False, 2 PLOS MEDICINE 0696 (2005), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 1182327/.
53. Kleiner & Kruger, supra note 1, at 677.
54. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 148 (1962).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 157.
57. See id. at 155-56.
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development of more or less close substitutes for the monopolized good
.58
or service.
More broadly, the behavior of even officially entrenched
professional monopolies may provoke, in the classic categories defined
by Professor Albert Hirschman, both "exit" and "voice."59 Members, or
clients, leaving the organization ("exit") may eventually prompt soul-
searching and reassessment by the organization. Disaffected members
and clients may also, through voice, "express their dissatisfaction
directly to management or to some other authority ... or through general
protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen ....
As Professor Hirschman uses the term, voice may closely
resemble speech, and on some occasions, something akin to free speech
generally. Professor Hirschman has gone so far as to argue that "in
certain situations, the use of voice can suddenly become a most sought-
after, fulfilling activity, in fact, the ultimate justification of human
existence." 61 Voice can be more or less spontaneous and uninvited,62 but
it can also be institutionalized. Merely one example of the latter would
be the American Psychiatric Association's providing for three rounds of
public commentary on proposed revisions to the fifth edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM-5.63
It goes without saying, though, that not every instance of exit or
voice, however pointed and articulate, should on the merits prompt a
revision of a professional group's institutional judgment as to what
58. See id. Of course, those who undermine an established professional
monopoly may, in turn, seek to legally cement their own monopoly power. See id. at
156.
59. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINES IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970).
60. See id. For further complications, see Gordon Tullock, Book Review, 25 J.
FINANCE 1194 (1970) (reviewing HIRSCHMAN, supra note 59).
61. Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a
Survey of Recent Contributions, 58 HEALTH & SOCIETY 430, 432 (1980) (referring
specifically to Vietnam War-era protests).
62. See id. (discussing the wide fluctuations of the use of voice according to
demands of society).
63. This institutionalization of voice elicited nearly 2300 public comments, to
whatever genuine effect. See News Release, DSM-5 Draft Criteria Draws Nearly
2,300 Responses, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N (Jun. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Advocacy%20and%20Newsroom/Press
%20Releases/2012%20Releases/12-30-Final-DSM-Public-Comment.pdf
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standards, rules, and policies best serve the interests of its diverse
constituencies. And as we have seen, what an organization, in the
exercise of its expert but fallible judgment, believes to be injurious
professional conduct may, more or less coincidentally, take the form of
65
speech. Some acts of speech are thus subject to reasonably
proportionate formal or informal sanction.66
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's Tatro opinion67 may at first
glance seem narrow in the scope and significance of its holding and
reasoning, as it avoids formally extending the Supreme Court's
Hazelwoof test to student speech that is sponsored by the school in
69
only the weakest and most attenuated sense. In the context of similar
cases,70 however, the legal and practical significance of Tatro can more
properly be recognized as broad. Complications aside, and in default of
substantial revision of one or more of the constitutional assumptions
referred to above,' the Tatro court's deference, in these general contexts,
to the judgment of the relevant professional organizations seems
72generally well-grounded.
64. See supra text accompanying note 52.
65. In general, speech may, in a given context, perform many sorts of actions.
For a classic discussion, see generally J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH
WORDS (J.O. Urmson, ed. 1976). The fact that assault on a public official, extortion,
attempted bribery, impersonating an officer, perjury, and fraud may take the form of
speech does not typically complicate their prohibition.
66. See id.
67. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012); see supra Part II.
68. See supra notes 7 & 25 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., supra notes 30-34, 42 and accompanying text.
71. See supra Part 1.
72. This would seem especially clear in cases in which the speech-as-
professional-conduct arguably violates a civil rights or privacy rights principle, or
arguably tends to undermine the quality of the professional relationship experience
for relatively marginalized or vulnerable groups.
